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Abstract SFAS No. 115 requires firms to recognize available-for-sale (AFS)
securities at fair value with accumulated unrealized gains and losses (AUGL)
recorded in accumulated other comprehensive income. Firms reclassify AUGL to
net income when they realize gains and losses. We refer to the amount reclassified
each period by ‘‘RECLASS.’’ As of 1998, SFAS No. 130 requires firms to present
RECLASS prominently in their financial statements. We investigate the incremental
explanatory power of RECLASS for banks’ market values and market-adjusted
returns. In the market value analysis, we control for AUGL, other components of
book value of equity, net income before extraordinary items and RECLASS
(NIBEXother), and other components of comprehensive income. In the returns
analysis, we control for DAUGL, DNIBEXother, and extraordinary items. We find
high positive coefficients on RECLASS in both analyses, consistent with investors
pricing RECLASS as a relatively permanent component of net income. Exploring
possible explanations for these pricing implications, we find no evidence that they
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are attributable to RECLASS remedying unreliable fair value measurement of
AUGL. We provide three distinct analyses indicating that RECLASS’s pricing
implications are explained in significant part by it helping investors predict banks’
future performance. Our results illustrate that an important type of amortized cost
accounting information, realized gains and losses, remains highly useful to investors
despite the overall fair-value-accounting framework for AFS securities.
Keywords Available-for-sale securities  Reclassification  Fair value
accounting  Realization
JEL classification G21  M41
1 Introduction
We investigate the incremental explanatory power of realized gains and losses on
available-for-sale (AFS) securities for commercial banks’ market value of equity
(market value) and market-adjusted returns (returns), controlling for accumulated
unrealized gains and losses on those securities (AUGL) and the other components of
book value of equity and comprehensive income. We focus on AFS securities
because US GAAP requires firms to recognize these securities at fair value on their
balance sheets but to report amortized cost information about realized gains and
losses on the securities on their income statements through the use of ‘‘dirty
surplus’’ accounting described below. This contrasts with the typical financial
reporting for financial instruments, in which one of fair value and amortized cost
information is reported only in footnote disclosures or not at all. Prior research
shows that investors react more strongly to amounts that are recognized in financial
statements rather than disclosed elsewhere in financial reports, either because
investors cannot or do not evaluate the disclosures or because they deem recognized
amounts more reliable (Schipper 2007). Hence AFS securities constitute a clean
setting to evaluate the pricing implications of amortized cost and fair value
information about financial instruments.
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 115, Accounting for
Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, requires a hybrid fair-value-on-
the-balance-sheet and amortized-cost-on-the-income-statement approach to
accounting for AFS securities. Firms record AFS securities on the balance sheet
at fair value, with AUGL recorded in accumulated other comprehensive income
(AOCI), a component of owners’ equity distinct from retained earnings. This
constitutes dirty surplus accounting because changes in owners’ equity occur
without corresponding changes in net income. Subsequently, firms reclassify AUGL
to net income when gains and losses are realized economically through sale of AFS
securities or for accounting purposes through transfer of the securities to trading or
other-than-temporary (OTT) impairment write-downs. This reclassification of gains
and losses upon realization is often referred to as ‘‘recycling’’; we denote the
amount reclassified each period by ‘‘RECLASS.’’
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Fair value accounting advocates criticize this accounting, particularly for liquid
AFS securities for which fair value is both reliably measured and a more relevant
measurement attribute than amortized cost.1 Even if unrealized gains and losses are
reliably measured, however, amortized cost information may be incrementally
useful for investment and other purposes. The FASB acknowledges this point in its
May 2010 Exposure Draft, Accounting for Financial Instruments and Revisions to
the Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, stating that
amortized costs may be relevant because of their association with contractual cash
flows or correspondence with firms’ business strategies.2
Critics of fair value accounting raise two opposing concerns. First, they question
the reliability of unrealized gains and losses, at least in some circumstances, either
in absolute terms (e.g., Wallison 2008 and Forbes 2009) or relative to the certain
measurement of realized gains and losses (Abdel-Khalik 2008). In our view,
reliability of measurement is a relatively minor concern for most of banks’ AFS
securities, which are primarily governmental and other liquid securities, although it
is a significant concern for some structured asset-backed and other illiquid
securities.3 Second, and more interestingly, some critics of fair value accounting
point out that financial reporting of realized amounts (of which realized gains and
losses on securities are only one type) is useful for various purposes, such as
contracting and stewardship assessment (Watts 1993; Holthausen and Watts 2001),
capital regulation (Khan 2010), and portraying firms’ business strategies (Nissim
and Penman 2008). Providing a rubric for this usefulness, Ronen (2008) states that
‘‘accounting should … provide information about the realization of expectations …
[to help investors in] assessing the reliability of expectations and the quality of
management performance, as well as in facilitating the improvement of the
forecasting process.’’
Consistent with this statement, we expect RECLASS to help investors predict
future bank performance for two compatible reasons. First, a longstanding literature
1 Schultz and Hollister (2003) and Johnson and Swieringa (1996) describe the political process and
resulting compromises involved in gaining general acceptance for SFAS No. 115. Interestingly, these
compromises occurred despite considerable support for fair value accounting for all investment securities
from SEC Chairman Richard Breeden (see his September 14, 1990, speech, ‘‘The Proper Role of
Financial Reporting: Market Based Accounting,’’ at Smith Barney’s Fourth Annual Financial Services
Conference in Washington, DC, available on the SEC website) and many bank regulators because the
thrift crisis had recently revealed the limitations of amortized cost accounting. Notably, however, Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan strongly opposed this change in accounting (see his November
1, 1990, letter to Richard Breeden, available http://economyblog.ncpa.org/wp-content/plugins/uploads/
Greenspan%20letter%20to%20SEC%20November%201990.pdf).
2 See the ‘‘What are the Main Aspects of the Proposed Guidance?’’ section on pp. 3–5 and paragraphs
BC57, BC58, and BC79 of the May 2010 exposure draft. In its redeliberations of the exposure draft to
date, the FASB proposes to require parenthetical presentation on the balance sheet of fair values for most
financial instruments measured at amortized cost and of amortized costs for financial liabilities (but not
financial assets) measured on fair value. See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Accounting for
Financial Instruments: Summary of Decisions Reached to Date during Redeliberations as of June 20,
2012, available on the FASB website.
3 Trevor Harris points out that securities typically viewed as highly liquid may experience significant
price pressures due to financial institutions’ concentrated and correlated trading behavior at certain times.
This behavior may occur at the end of accounting periods due to performance evaluation of employees,
end-of-period financial statement window dressing, or other reasons.
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finds that banks realize gains and losses on AFS securities to smooth their reported
net income.4 To the extent this occurs, RECLASS makes reported net income more
permanent and thus more indicative of future income.5 Second, RECLASS should
help investors evaluate the reliability of the reported fair values of banks’ AFS
securities and thus help them predict future income on these securities.
We hand-collected RECLASS for the 200 largest publicly traded US commercial
banks (based on total assets in 1998) for the period 1998–2006. We limit our sample
to banks because total (realized) gains and losses on AFS securities often constitute
significant portions of their owners’ equity (net income). Our sample period begins
in 1998, when SFAS No. 130, Reporting Comprehensive Income, required firms to
disclose RECLASS prominently in financial statements.6
We estimate both market value and returns models, because the former contains
less noisy explanatory variables but is more prone to scale-related specification
problems than the latter. The empirical results for the two models are consistent,
indicating that neither type of specification issue drives our results. Motivated by
Ohlson (1995), the market value model controls for AUGL, other components of
book value of equity, net income before extraordinary items, discontinued
operations, and RECLASS (NIBEXother), extraordinary items and discontinued
operations (EX), DAUGL, and other components of other comprehensive income.
Similar to Badertscher et al. (2012), who examine the related setting of OTT
impairment write-downs of investment securities, the returns model controls for
DNIBEXother, EX, DAUGL, and other components of other comprehensive income.
Our primary findings are as follows. First, we find at least normal pricing
implications for AUGL in the market value model and DAUGL in the returns
model. For example, in the market value model the coefficient on AUGL is larger
than the coefficient on the amortized cost of AFS securities. We interpret these
findings as implying that RECLASS’s pricing implications are not primarily
attributable to it remedying unreliable fair value measurement of (D)AUGL.
Second, we find that the coefficients on RECLASS significantly exceed one and
are closer to the coefficients on relatively permanent NIBEXother in the market value
model and DNIBEXother in the returns model than to the coefficients on the more
transitory components of comprehensive income. Our remaining analyses investi-
gate possible explanations for RECLASS’s high pricing implications.
Third, we consider the possibility that unrealized gains and losses are unreliable,
as critics of fair value accounting often allege, and that RECLASS remedies this
unreliability. This possibility is inconsistent with our findings for (D)AUGL and
4 See Scholes et al. (1990), Beatty et al. (1995), Collins et al. (1995), Beatty et al. (2002), Cornett et al.
(2009), and Chang et al. (2011).
5 Realization of gains and losses on AFS securities is only one of banks’ primary mechanisms for income
management, along with the provision for loan losses, realization of gains and losses on other assets and
liabilities, and Level 2 and 3 fair value estimates for trading and other positions for which unrealized
gains and losses are recorded in net income. As discussed in Sect. 4, we find that RECLASS offsets a
significant but relatively small portion of the variation in net income.
6 From 1993 to 1997, users of financial reports generally could have, with some effort, determined
RECLASS from SFAS No. 115-required AFS securities footnote disclosures of AUGL, realized gains and
losses, transfers of securities between the standard’s three categories (trading, AFS, and held-to-maturity),
and OTT impairment write-downs.
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with the high liquidity of most AFS securities, particularly during our largely
favorable 1998–2006 sample period. It also cannot, by itself, explain why we find
that the coefficients on RECLASS are well in excess of one, the normal coefficient
on a perfectly measured but transitory item. Directly contradicting this possibility,
we find that the coefficients on RECLASS in both the market value and returns
models are more positive for banks that hold more liquid securities.
Fourth, we consider the possibility that RECLASS helps investors predict future
bank performance. Unlike the unreliable fair value measurement possibility, this
might explain why we find that the coefficients on RECLASS are well in excess of
one. For example, if RECLASS is transitory but offsets other transitory income and
thereby makes reported net income (more) permanent, then in a pricing model that
includes pre-managed income, the coefficient on RECLASS will be that for a
(more) permanent income item.
We provide three findings consistent with the pricing implications of RECLASS
being attributable in significant part to it helping investors predict future bank
performance:
• Coefficients on RECLASS in the market value and returns models are more
positive for banks with higher growth in net interest income, for which
predicting future performance is a more important and difficult task.
• RECLASS is significantly positively associated with year-ahead comprehensive
income and two of its components—year-ahead NIBEXother and RECLASS—
controlling for current AUGL and the other components of book value and
comprehensive income. These effects are stronger for banks that have higher
growth.
• Including the components of year-ahead comprehensive income in the market
value and returns models significantly reduces the coefficients on RECLASS for
firms with higher growth.7
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to document the pricing
implications of reclassifications of any component of AOCI,8 thereby addressing Rees
and Shane’s (2012) call for research on recycling. Our results significantly update and
expand upon prior research on the pricing implications of banks’ realized and
unrealized gains and losses by Barth (1994), who finds that realized gains do not
7 Consistent with evidence of functional fixation on earnings and other forms of mispricing in the
literature (e.g., Lakonishok et al. 1994; Sloan 1996; Teohe et al. 1998; and Penman and Zhang 2002), we
also considered the possibility that investors undervalue periodic unrealized gains and losses (UGL). We
regressed returns for the 12 months beginning five months after fiscal year-end on UGL, Fama and
French’s (1992, 1993) three factors, and stock return momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). We found
statistically weak (at the 10 % level) evidence that banks with higher unrealized gains and losses
experience economically modest higher future excess returns (0.5 % higher for the highest versus lowest
deciles of UGL). Including the year-ahead change in RECLASS in the regression model weakened the
drift and rendered it statistically insignificant, consistent with investors mispricing unrealized gains and
losses in part because they do not fully incorporate their association with future RECLASS. Given the
statistically weak and economically modest return drift, we concluded that investor mispricing explains at
most a small portion of the high pricing implications of RECLASS.
8 Badertscher et al. (2012) examine the pricing implications of banks’ OTT impairments, which may but
need not involve reclassifications of AOCI, depending on the extent to which the deteriorations of value
captured in these impairments develop prior to the reporting quarter. We discuss this extent in Sect. 2.
246 M. Dong et al.
123
explain market value or returns, and Ahmed and Takeda (1995), who find that realized
gains and losses explain returns only after controlling for the joint effect of interest rate
exposure and interest rate movements during the period. Our primary contribution to
these papers is to provide evidence that RECLASS’s pricing implications obtain in
significant part from it helping investors predict future bank performance.
Our results have implications for the debate about the relative and incremental
usefulness of fair value versus amortized cost accounting for financial instruments.
Our findings collectively support the FASB’s view expressed in the May 2010
exposure draft that preserving amortized cost information based on the realization
principle within a fair-value-accounting framework is useful to investors. This
support is subject to two caveats, however. First, we document associations between
RECLASS and market value, returns, and year-ahead comprehensive income, not
that investors rely directly on RECLASS or that compensating mechanisms would
not arise were RECLASS not required to be reported. Second, while we provide
evidence that RECLASS facilitates investors’ prediction of future bank performance
by statistically reliably offsetting transitory bank income, this income smoothing
does not appear to be large in magnitude or to significantly affect the market pricing
of our (imperfect) measure of pre-smoothed income, NIBEXother.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes
relevant prior research. Section 3 develops our hypotheses and describes our
research design. Section 4 describes the sample and data sources and provides
descriptive statistics of the variables. Section 5 contains the analysis of the pricing
implications of RECLASS. Section 6 examines the potential explanations for these
pricing implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 Prior research
Our study is primarily related to two areas of prior research: (1) studies on the
incremental and relative pricing implications of the amortized costs and fair values
of banks’ financial instruments, of which there are several distinct subareas, and (2)
studies on the incremental and relative pricing implications of comprehensive
income versus net income. We discuss these literatures in turn.
2.1 Pricing implications of amortized costs and fair values of banks’ financial
instruments
2.1.1 Gains and losses on investment securities
Barth (1994) and Ahmed and Takeda (1995) examine the pricing implications of
disclosures of unrealized and realized gains and losses on banks’ investment
securities.9 Barth estimates market value and (raw) returns models in annual cross-
9 Barth (1994) hand collected the fair values of marketable securities for a sample of banks from 1970 to
1990 that appear to have disclosed the fair values of marketable securities in financial reports under
industry GAAP or practice. Ahmed and Takeda (1995) obtained similar data from commercial bank
holding companies’ regulatory Y-9C filings from the second quarter of 1986 to the fourth quarter of 1991.
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sectional regressions and in pooled regressions with fixed effects. Ahmed and
Takeda estimate (raw) returns models in pooled regressions.
Barth’s market value model regresses market value on book value and the fair
value and amortized cost of marketable securities. Estimation of this model yields a
significantly positive coefficient on the fair value of marketable securities and an
insignificant or significantly negative coefficient on the amortized cost of
marketable securities. Barth concludes that the fair values of marketable securities
provide significant explanatory power beyond amortized costs but not vice versa.
Barth’s returns model regresses returns on the level or change in net income before
securities gains and losses, periodic realized gains and losses, and periodic total
(realized plus unrealized) gains and losses. Estimation of this model yields a
negative coefficient on realized gains and losses and a positive coefficient on total
gains and losses that usually is insignificant except for large banks holding liquid
securities. Barth interprets the weaker results in the returns model as attributable to
greater noise in these income statement variables.
Ahmed and Takeda (1995) argue that the weakness of Barth’s (1994) returns
models results is attributable in part to omitted changes in the value of other net
assets resulting from interest rate movements during the year. After controlling for
the joint effect of the bank’s exposure to interest rates and the change in interest
rates during the year, Ahmed and Takeda find significant increases in the pricing
implications of both unrealized and realized gains and losses in their returns
model.10
We modify and extend Barth (1994) and Ahmed and Takeda’s (1995) analyses
and findings in two primary ways. First, we find considerably stronger pricing
implications for realized gains and losses than do either of these studies, particularly
Barth who finds no pricing implications, but also Ahmed and Takeda who report a
coefficient on realized gains and losses of 0.71, only 12 % of the 6.01 coefficient on
RECLASS that we report in the returns model analysis reported in Table 3, Panel B.
We believe that these stronger pricing implications obtain in part because these
prior studies examine sample periods in which both realized and unrealized gains
and losses on AFS securities were not prominently disclosed in financial reports and
thus were less salient to users of financial reports. Specifically, the sample periods in
both studies precede the issuance of any FASB fair value accounting or disclosure
standard (i.e., pre-SFAS No. 107). Investors likely had not yet become comfortable
using fair value information.
Since the effective date of SFAS No. 115 in 1993, AFS securities have been
recognized at fair value on the balance sheet with standardized tabular format
disclosures of AUGL and disclosures of realized gains and losses by type of
investment security required in footnotes. Since the effective date of SFAS No. 130
in 1998, RECLASS has been prominently recognized in financial statements.
Hence, for almost two decades, investors have been provided with visible
information about fair values and related unrealized and realized gains and losses
for AFS securities in financial reports. This presumably constitutes sufficient time
10 Ahmed and Takeda (1995) also examine the effects of income, capital, and tax management on the
pricing implications of unrealized and realized gains and losses.
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for them to have become accustomed to and learned how to use this information.
Moreover, as discussed below, prior research provides strong evidence that SFAS
No. 130 increased the pricing implications of (the components of) comprehensive
income.
Second, we provide evidence that RECLASS’s high pricing implications are
attributable in significant part to it helping investors predict future bank
performance. We believe we observe these results obtain in part because banks
changed considerably from the 1972–1990 period examined by Barth (1994) and the
second quarter 1986 through fourth quarter 1991 period examined by Ahmed and
Takeda (1995) to our 1998–2006 sample period. In these prior periods, many banks
experienced poor economic performance and economic undercapitalization, prob-
lems that ultimately led to the thrift crisis toward the ends of these periods. Banks
also held much longer duration assets than liabilities and faced considerable interest
rate volatility, yielding high interest rate risk. For these reasons, banks’ primary
incentive to realize gains and losses during this period was to increase their
regulatory capital, not to smooth their income. In fact, Ahmed and Takeda provide
evidence that banks realized gains to increase capital during their sample period.
In contrast, during our 1998–2006 sample period, banks experienced sustained
high profitability and regulatory capital, and markets for investment securities
generally were liquid. Moreover, the vast majority of banks have avoided significant
duration mismatches since no later than 1994. This environment was more
amenable to banks realizing gains and losses on AFS securities to smooth income
toward expected future income.
2.1.2 Other-than-temporary impairments of investment securities
Badertscher et al. (2012) examine the pricing implications of banks’ OTT
impairments of investment securities under the recently issued FSP FAS 115-2
and 124-2. This FSP amended FAS 115 to include only the component of the
decline in fair value of investment securities attributable to declines in cash flows in
OTT impairments and thus in net income. This component is included in
RECLASS, our focus, to the extent that it reflects AOCI at the beginning of the
reporting quarter rather than losses occurring during the quarter.
Our analysis and results overlap with those of Badertscher et al. (2012) in three
limited respects. First, only 11 observations of nonzero RECLASS during our
economically favorable 1998–2006 sample period result in part or whole from OTT
impairments, i.e., slightly more than one per year. In contrast, Badertscher et al.’s
economically unfavorable 2008–2009 sample during the crisis includes at least 239
quarterly OTT impairments by banks (at least one quarter of their 958 observations,
as reported in their Table 3), i.e., 30 per quarter.
Second, OTT impairments during Badertscher et al.’s (2012) sample period
likely include substantial portions that are not reclassifications of AOCI as well as
portions that are reclassifications of AOCI. For example, Badertscher et al. state that
‘‘OTTI charges did not become large until September 2008,’’ a period of economic
free fall. OTT impairments recorded in such sharply deteriorating economic
conditions likely include sizeable losses occurring during the reporting quarter.
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Third, Badertscher et al. (2012) find that the component of OTT impairments
recorded in net income have higher pricing implications than the component of the
decline in fair value attributable to increases in discount rates, which remains in
AOCI after the OTT impairment under the FSP. To the extent that the cash flow
component of a decline in fair value is closer to a realized loss than is the discount
rate component of that decline, Badertscher et al.’s results are consistent with ours.
2.1.3 All financial instruments
Advocates of fair value accounting generally claim that the fair values of financial
instruments are more relevant to investors than are the amortized costs of the
instruments. Numerous empirical studies provide some support for this claim. These
studies often, but not always, find that market values are significantly incrementally
associated with fair values controlling for amortized costs, but not vice versa. The
results of the studies depend on the type and liquidity of the financial instruments
considered and the type of firms involved as well as aspects of the research design
such as the use of market value versus returns models and inclusion of control
variables. We describe only the three earliest and most influential studies below, all
of which examine samples of banks.
Using disclosed fair values under SFAS No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Values
of Financial Instruments, Barth et al. (1996), Nelson (1996), and Eccher et al.
(1996) examine the incremental pricing implications of the differences between the
disclosed fair values and reported carrying values (typically amortized costs) of
essentially all banks’ financial instruments, including securities, loans, deposits, and
debt. The results of the three studies differ somewhat due to their differing model
specifications. This is particularly true for loans, banks’ most important asset, for
which only Barth et al. find the differences between fair value and amortized cost to
have incremental pricing implications.
Overall, the results of these studies suggest that banks’ reported fair values have
incremental pricing implications but also exhibit some degree of measurement
unreliability depending on the instrument involved and other contextual factors.
Thus these studies leave open the possibility that realizations of previously reported
unrealized gains and losses can also be incrementally informative to investors.
2.2 Comprehensive income
Studies investigating the pricing implications of comprehensive income generally
find that these implications strengthened after the effective date of SFAS No. 130,
consistent with investors responding more to amounts that are recognized in
financial statements rather than disclosed in footnotes. For a sample prior to the
effective date of SFAS No. 130, Dhaliwal et al. (1999) find that the association of
returns with comprehensive income is stronger than the association of returns with
net income, except for financial firms. They also find that the AFS securities
adjustment is the only component of other comprehensive income that improves the
association of returns with income, again primarily for financial firms. O’Hanlon
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and Pope (1999) report similarly negative results for other comprehensive income
items for a sample of UK firms.
In contrast, for samples after the effective date of SFAS No. 130, Biddle and Choi
(2006) find that comprehensive income dominates other income measures in explaining
equity returns. Chambers et al. (2007) find that the association between returns and the
components of other comprehensive income is approximately dollar-for-dollar for the
non-AFS security components (e.g., cash flow hedges and pensions) and considerably
more than dollar-for-dollar (3.45, with a t statistic of 4.12 on the difference from 1) for
the AFS security component. Chambers et al. unsuccessfully attempt to explain this
higher-than-expected association by controlling for interest rate changes (which drive
changes in the value of many of banks’ other financial instruments) and net debt (a proxy
for the extent of banks’ asset-liability management).
Somewhat analogous to the capital markets studies just described, Bamber et al.
(2010) examine managerial choices to disclose other comprehensive income in a
performance statement that includes net income rather than in another allowed
format. They find that managers with stronger equity incentives and lower job
security are significantly less likely to report other comprehensive income in a
performance statement, suggesting these managers believe the visibility of other
comprehensive income is enhanced when disclosed in that format. Consistent with
Bamber et al.’s results, in ASU 2011-5, Presentation of Comprehensive Income, the
FASB recently required firms to disclose the components of comprehensive income
in a performance statement, a requirement the board subsequently extended to
reclassifications out of AOCI into net income in ASU 2013-02, Reporting of
Amounts Reclassified Out of Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income. To avoid
striating our limited number of observations on too many dimensions, we do not
distinguish the particular format that banks use to make the required disclosures.
3 Research design and hypothesis development
3.1 RECLASS and the mechanics of recycling gains and losses
Under SFAS No. 115, firms initially record after-tax unrealized gains and losses on
AFS securities in accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI), a component
of owners’ equity. Accumulated unrealized gains and losses (AUGL) remain in
AOCI until one of the following events occurs involving the securities:
(a) Sale,
(b) Transfer to trading, or
(c) Other-than-temporary (OTT) impairment write-downs.
When one of these events occurs, the related AUGL is reclassified to net income
(with pretax realized gains and losses and tax effects recorded on separate line items
on the income statement) and retained earnings. We refer to the after-tax
reclassification as RECLASS. RECLASS changes the components but not the total
amounts of owners’ equity and comprehensive income. As a result, RECLASS often
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is referred to as ‘‘recycling’’ amounts previously recognized on the balance sheet
onto the income statement.
The following equations illustrate the mechanics of this recycling. All amounts are
aftertax in these equations and the remainder of the paper. Net income (NI) during a
period equals net income before realized gains and losses (NIBRGL) plus RECLASS.
NIt ¼ NIBRGLt þ RECLASSt: ð1Þ
The change in retained earnings (RE) during a period equals NI minus dividends (DIV)
during the period, which equals NIBRGL plus RECLASS minus DIV during the period:
DREt ¼ NIt  DIVt ¼ NIBRGLt þ RECLASSt  DIVt: ð2Þ
Hence RE increases with RECLASS.
The change in AUGL during a period equals the unrealized gain or loss (UGL)
during the period. UGL equals the total (i.e., unrealized plus realized) gain or loss
(TGL) minus RECLASS during the period.
DAUGLt ¼ UGLt ¼ TGLt  RECLASSt ð3Þ
Hence AUGL decreases with RECLASS.
The change in owners’ equity (OE) equals DRE plus DAOCI plus the change in
contributed capital (DCC) during the period. DRE is given in Eq. (2) and DAOCI
equals DAUGL plus other comprehensive income from sources other than AFS
securities (OCIother) during the period, yielding
DOEt ¼ DREt þ DAOCIt þ DCCt
¼ NIBRGLt þ RECLASSt  DIVt þ TGLt  RECLASSt þ OCIothert þ DCCt
¼ NIBRGLt þ TGLt  DIVt þ OCIothert þ DCCt:
ð4Þ
Hence DOE is unaffected by RECLASS due to its perfectly offsetting effects on RE
and AOCI.
3.2 Market value model
Our market value model is an expanded version of the frequently estimated
regression of market value on book value of equity, denoted BV, and comprehen-
sive income, denoted CI:
MVt ¼ a þ b1BVt þ b2CIt þ et: ð5Þ
Ohlson (1995) derives a model similar to Eq. (5) from three assumptions: (1)
dividend discounting with a constant cost of equity r, (2) clean surplus accounting,
and (3) a first-order autoregressive process for abnormal comprehensive income.11
Ohlson shows that perfectly transitory (e.g., fair value accounting-based) abnormal
11 Equation (7) in Ohlson (1995) differs in four primary respects from our Eq. (5). First, Ohlson’s
comprehensive income term is a capitalization of comprehensive income reduced by dividends. Second,
the weights on the book value and income terms are inversely related. Third, he allows for non-
accounting information. Fourth, his equation does not include an intercept.
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comprehensive income yields a pure balance sheet model with b1 = 1 and b2 = 0.
He shows that perfectly permanent abnormal comprehensive income yields a pure
income statement model with b1 = 0 and, assuming a constant rate of dividend
payout of comprehensive income k, b2 = (1 ? r)/r - k.
12
We decompose both BV and CI into components in fashions consistent with but
somewhat more detailed than Eqs. (1)–(4). Specifically, we decompose BV into the
after-tax book value of AFS securities (BVafs) plus the after-tax book value of other
net assets (BVother). We further decompose BVafs into the amortized cost of AFS
securities (COST) plus AUGL. We decompose CI into RECLASS, NIBEXother, EX,
and other comprehensive income (OCI). We further decompose OCI into DAUGL
(which equals TGL–RECLASS or equivalently UGL) and OCIother. Incorporating
these variable decompositions into Eq. (5) yields the market value model:
MVt ¼ a þ b1COSTt þ b2AUGLt þ b3BVothert þ b4RECLASSt þ b5NIBEXothert
þ b6EXt þ b7 DAUGLt þ b8OCIothert þ et: ð6Þ
We also estimate nested versions of Eq. (6) that include only the balance sheet
variables COST, AUGL, and BVother or only the comprehensive income statement
variables RECLASS, NIBEXother, EX, DAUGL, and OCIother.
3.3 Returns model
Because market value models such as Eq. (6) are susceptible to scale-related
specification problems, we also estimate a returns model (Easton and Sommers
2003). The trade-off is that the first-differenced explanatory variables in returns
models generally are noisier, as discussed by Barth (1994). We estimate a returns
model that is simpler than Eq. (6) to avoid exacerbating the effects of this noise
through over-differenced or multicollinear explanatory variables.
Our returns model is motivated by Badertscher et al. (2012), who regress market-
adjusted returns on the changes in the relatively permanent components of
comprehensive income and the levels of the relatively transitory components of
comprehensive income. In Eq. (6), the only relatively permanent component of
comprehensive income is NIBEXother and the relatively transitory components are
RECLASS, EX, DAUGL, and OCIother. Applying Badertscher et al.’s approach to
these comprehensive income variables and denoting market-adjusted returns for the
12-month period ending at the end of the fourth month after the firm’s fiscal year
end by Rt, yields the returns model:
Rt ¼ a þ b1RECLASSt þ b2DNIBEXothert þ b3EXt þ b4DAUGLt þ b5OCIothert þ et:
ð7Þ
Consistent with the specification of Rt, the explanatory variables in Eq. (7) are
deflated by beginning-of-return-interval market capitalization.
12 If dividend payout is not constant, then dividends should be incorporated in Ohlson’s (1995)
capitalized comprehensive income term. However, prior research by Hand and Landsman (1998) finds
that including dividends in the Ohlson model empirically appears to capture dividends signaling future
income rather than dividend payout.
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While Eq. (7) yields slightly better goodness of fit than a model that includes the
changes rather than levels in the relatively transitory components of comprehensive
income, our results and related interpretations are not qualitatively affected by this
choice. It is important that RECLASS and DAUGL are treated the same way,
however, to maintain the algebraic relationship between these variables in Eq. (3).
In untabulated robustness tests for Eqs. (6) and (7), we include a large number of
control variables motivated by Ahmed and Takeda (1995)—in particular, their
interactive interest rate exposure/interest rate change variable—and the broader
banking literature. We also further decompose the explanatory variables by line
item. These robustness tests yield the same inferences as the tests reported in the
paper. Ahmed and Takeda’s interactive interest rate variable is insignificant in all
models, apparently due to banks’ considerably reduced interest rate exposure and
the lower interest rate volatility during our sample period compared to their prior
sample period.
We develop five pairs of null and alternative hypotheses that investigate the
extent and determinants of the pricing implications of RECLASS.
3.4 Pricing implications hypotheses
The first pair of hypotheses pertains to whether RECLASS has pricing implications
incremental to (D)AUGL and the other explanatory variables in Eqs. (6) and (7).
The null hypothesis is that RECLASS has no incremental pricing implications,
because (D)AUGL and the other control variables convey all relevant information.
The alternative hypothesis is that RECLASS has positive incremental pricing
implications due to the importance of realization.
In Eqs. (6) and (7), RECLASS appears both directly as a separate variable (its
effect on NI) as indirectly as a decrease in DAUGLt (its effect on OCI). While this
double inclusion of RECLASS in the empirical models may appear complex, it
results from the offsetting effects of reclassifications of AOCI into net income
associated with recycling and so cannot be eliminated from the models without
either suppressing recycling (i.e., RECLASS has offsetting effects on net income
and other comprehensive income but no effects on comprehensive income) or losing
the models’ underlying structure attributable to Ohlson (1995) or Badertscher et al.
(2012). Hence we state this and subsequent hypotheses as restrictions on the ‘‘total’’
coefficients on RECLASS. The total coefficient is b4 - b7 in the market value
model Eq. (6) and b1 - b4 in the returns model Eq. (7).
13
13 RECLASS also affects AUGL and, depending on the type of realization of gains and losses, one of
COST or BVother in Eq. (6) [This issue does not arise in Eq. (7)]. For example, for economic realizations
of gains, RECLASS also appears as an increase in BVother (its effect on cash) and a decrease in AUGL (its
effect on AFS securities). However, unlike RECLASS’s direct and indirect effects discussed in the text,
these two additional effects would exist in a clean surplus fair value accounting system that does not
report RECLASS or otherwise preserve amortized cost information about realized gains and losses. We
conduct our tests using the total coefficient b4-b7 because it better corresponds to our focus. However, we
have also conducted all tests using the alternative total coefficient (b3 ? b4) - (b2 ? b7), which yields
the same conclusions as for our tests using b4 - b7, albeit with slightly lower significance levels (e.g.,
5 % instead of 1 % in our primary tests reported in column III of Table 3, Panel A).
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H1N: b4 - b7 = 0 in the market value model (b1 - b4 = 0 in the returns model).
H1A: b4 - b7 [ 0 in the market value model (b1 - b4 [ 0 in the returns
model).14
For brevity, we combine the hypotheses for the market value and returns models
in this and the following hypotheses.
If banks use RECLASS to offset variation in NIBEXother, thereby enabling
investors to better predict future NIBEXother, the inclusion of RECLASS in the
empirical models should also increase the coefficients on (D)NIBEXother in the
market value (returns) models. We do not make hypotheses about the effect of the
inclusion of RECLASS on these coefficients, because we do not know whether
banks use RECLASS to smooth NIBEXother versus other income variables, whether
the income variable smoothed varies across banks or time, or the amount of the
noise in any income smoothing using RECLASS, given that banks have various
other income smoothing mechanisms (see footnote 5). However, we do report and
discuss the effect of the inclusion of RECLASS on these coefficients.
3.5 Unreliable fair value measurement hypotheses
Our second pair of hypotheses examines whether RECLASS’s pricing implications
are attributable to the unreliability of reported fair values, as critics of fair value
accounting often allege. To the extent that this allegation is true and RECLASS
remedies the unreliability of reported fair values, RECLASS’s pricing implications
should be more positive for banks that hold less liquid securities for which fair
values likely are measured less reliably:
H2N: b4 - b7 in the market value model (b1 - b4 in the returns model) does not
vary with the liquidity of banks’ AFS securities.
H2A: b4 - b7 in the market value model (b1 - b4 in the returns model) is more
positive for banks holding less liquid AFS securities.
As discussed in Sect. 2, while hypothesis H2A has some attractiveness and is
consistent with Barth’s (1994) results, there are also several strong reasons to
believe it will not hold during our sample period.
3.6 Predicting future bank performance hypotheses
Our remaining hypotheses examine the possibility that RECLASS’s pricing
implications result from it helping investors predict future bank performance, a
14 We do not consider the effect of taxes on the total coefficient on RECLASS (an aftertax variable).
Warfield and Linsmeier (1992) examine the effect of cross-sectional differences in taxes on the
coefficient on realized gains and losses. They argue and provide evidence that realized losses for tax-
paying firms and realized gains for nontax-paying firms convey good news, at least for the first three
quarters of the fiscal year. In principle, these differences could affect the coefficients on RECLASS in our
empirical models. Due to the almost universal good health of the banking industry during our sample
period—far better than the 1980–1985 period examined by Warfield and Linsmeier—our sample banks
invariably paid taxes.
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more important and difficult task for higher growth banks. This would occur if
banks realize gains and losses on AFS securities to smooth their reported net income
towards management’s expectations of future income, as discussed by Barnea et al.
(1976), Ronen and Sadan (1981), and Ronen (2008).15 Banks have considerable
ability to smooth income in this fashion, because they actively use AFS securities in
asset-liability management, and so gains (losses) on these securities are likely to be
economically offset by losses (gains) on other positions they hold. We provide
descriptive evidence that RECLASS smoothes income in Sect. 4.
Unlike the unreliable fair value measurement possibility, this possibility can
yield a coefficient above one on RECLASS. This point is obvious if RECLASS is
permanent, but it also holds, for example, if RECLASS is transitory but offsets other
transitory income and thereby makes reported net income (more) permanent. In that
case, in a pricing model that includes pre-managed income, the coefficient on
RECLASS will be that for a (more) permanent income item.
To demonstrate this point simply, assume price equals a constant perpetuity
factor times permanent income and that pre-managed income equals permanent
income plus an uncorrelated transitory item. If a managed income item perfectly
offsets that transitory item, then price equals the perpetuity factor times premanaged
income plus the offsetting managed item, i.e., the coefficient on the managed item
would be the perpetuity factor. (Moreover, if the managed item perfectly offsets a
fixed proportion less than 100 % of the transitory item, then the coefficient on the
managed item would be above the perpetuity factor.) It is straightforward, although
tedious depending on the assumptions made, to show this point holds under more
general assumptions.
The next pair of hypotheses examines whether RECLASS has stronger pricing
implications for higher growth banks for which predicting future bank performance
is more important and difficult.
H3N: b4 - b7 in the market value model (b1 - b4 in the returns model) does not
vary with banks’ growth.
H3A: b4 - b7 in the market value model (b1 - b4 in the returns model) is more
positive for higher growth banks.
To directly test whether RECLASS’s pricing implications result from it helping
investors to predict future income, we regress year-ahead CI on the same
explanatory variables in Eq. (6).
CItþ1 ¼ d þ c1COSTafst þ c2AUGLt þ c3BVothert þ c4RECLASSt þ c5NIBEXothert
þc6EXt þ c7DAUGLt þ c8OCIothert þ gt: ð8Þ
We also estimate Eq. (8) with two components of CIt?1 as the dependent variable,
NIBEXt?1
other, and RECLASSt?1. Regardless of the dependent variable, the null
and alternative hypotheses pertain to the total coefficient on RECLASS in Eq. (8),
15 We do not investigate whether realization of gains and losses smooths net income in a fashion deemed
credible by investors. We note, however, that costs that might yield such credibility include regulatory
costs associated with realization of losses, tax costs associated with realization of gains, and reputational
consequences for managers who manage income along an ex post unsmooth path.
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c4 - c7. Under the alternative hypothesis, we expect this total coefficient to be
positive when the pricing implications of RECLASS are positive.
H4N: c4–c7 = 0 for samples for which b4 - b7 [ 0 in the market value model
(b1 - b4 [ 0 in the returns model).
H4A: c4 - c7 [ 0 for samples for which b4 - b7 [ 0 in the market value model
(b1 - b4 [ 0 in the returns model).
In testing hypothesis H4, we focus on the growth subsamples across which we
expect, based on the results of testing hypothesis H3, RECLASS’s predictive power
for future bank performance to vary the most.
To test directly whether RECLASS’s pricing implications stem from its
predictive power over future comprehensive income, we add the components of
year-ahead comprehensive income to Eqs. (6) and (7) in exactly the same forms that
the components of current comprehensive income appear in the models. For brevity,
we do not reproduce these models with the additional variables. We denote the
coefficients in these expanded models with primes. We hypothesize that the total
coefficients on RECLASS for the current year decrease with the inclusion of the
components of year-ahead comprehensive income.
H5N: B04 - b07 = b4 - b7 in the market value model (b01 - b04 = b1 - b4 in
the returns model).
H5A: B04 - b07 \b4 - b7 in the market value model (b01 - b04 \ b1 - b4 in the
returns model).
In testing hypothesis H5, we focus on the high growth subsample for which we
expect, based on the results of testing hypotheses H3 and H4, RECLASS’s
predictive power for future bank performance to have the largest effect on
RECLASS’s pricing implications.
4 Sample, data, and descriptive statistics
We obtain most accounting and market value data from Compustat and stock return
data from CRSP. We hand collected AUGL and RECLASS from disclosures of the
components of (accumulated) other comprehensive income in banks’ annual reports.
In the ‘‘Appendix’’, we provide several examples of these disclosures.
SFAS No. 130 requires firms to prominently report other comprehensive income
and its components in financial statements for fiscal years beginning after December
15, 1997. For this reason, our sample period begins in 1998, and it covers the nine
fiscal years through 2006. Because of the time required to hand collect AUGL and
RECLASS, we restrict our sample to the 200 largest US commercial banks based on
total assets in 1998. We also require the sample banks to be traded on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ and to have all necessary data on the variables in Eq. (6). The
market capitalization of the 200 banks ranges from $50 million to $230 billion,
indicating that our sample selection based on size is not particularly restrictive. Our
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final sample contains 1,033 bank-year observations with complete data on the
Eq. (6) variables.
Recall that RECLASS results from three different events: sales of AFS securities,
transfer of the securities to trading, and OTT impairment write-downs of the
securities. The first event involves economic realization, and the second and third
events involve realization for accounting purposes only. Analysis of our hand-
collected disclosures indicates that only 11 of the sample observations had
reclassifications that were due in part or whole to AFS securities being transferred to
trading or other-than-temporary impairment write-downs, i.e., realization for
accounting purposes only.16 The low frequency of transfers to trading likely results
from the proviso in paragraph 15 of SFAS No. 115 that such transfers should be
‘‘rare.’’ The low frequency of OTT impairment write-downs likely results from our
sample period preceding the financial crisis and the fact that firms generally do not
record impairments for declines in value driven by movements in interest rates
unless they have decided to sell the affected securities. Hence almost all of the
variation in RECLASS reflects sales of securities, i.e., economic realization.
Table 1 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in Eqs.
(6) and (7) as well as other variables. The mean of AUGL is 8 cents per share, with a
sizeable standard deviation of 68 cents per share. AUGL likely is positive on
average because interest rates decreased significantly and fairly steadily for almost
two decades prior to our sample period. Equity prices also rose considerably, albeit
less steadily, over this period.
The mean of RECLASS is 3 cents per share, with a standard deviation of 16 cents
per share. The mean ratio of the absolute value of RECLASS to the absolute value
of NIBEXother is 5 %, with a standard deviation of 20 %, indicating that the
realization of gains and losses on AFS securities typically has a sizeable effect on
net income, although by no means does RECLASS offset all of the variation in
NIBEXother. The mean of TGL is negative 2 cents per share, with a standard
deviation of 57 cents per share. The opposite signs of mean TGL and mean
RECLASS indicate a disconnect exists between total and realized gains and losses.
The standard deviation of TGL is about three and a half times larger than the
standard deviation of RECLASS, illustrating that total gains and losses are far more
variable than are realized gains and losses.
Table 1 Panel B1 (Panel B2) reports correlations of the explanatory variables in
Eq. (6) [Eq. (7)]. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are reported above (below) the
diagonals. In Panel B1, RECLASS has a significant positive correlation with AUGL
of 0.20 Pearson and 0.27 Spearman, consistent with banks realizing gains and losses
in a fashion that reflects unrealized gains and losses available to be realized to some
degree. RECLASS has a significant negative correlation with NIBEXother of -0.10,
both Pearson and Spearman, consistent with banks using RECLASS to smooth net
income. In Panel B2, RECLASS has a significant negative Spearman correlation
16 Possibly this low frequency reflects nondisclosure by banks of immaterial realizations for accounting
purposes only, given that SFAS No. 115’s provisions need not be applied to immaterial items. Partly for
this reason, we do not remove these 11 observations from the sample. Our results are not noticeably
affected by the removal of these observations from the sample.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean STDEV Q1 Median Q3
Panel A: Distribution of explanatory and other variables
Market value model variables (per share)
COSTafs 39.06 36.20 20.95 31.79 47.70
AUGL 0.08 0.68 -0.16 0.04 0.30
BVother -23.58 33.72 -32.19 -18.64 -7.74
RECLASS 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.05
NIBEXother 2.02 1.22 1.38 1.80 2.42
EX 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.01
DAUGL -0.05 0.56 -0.27 -0.01 0.19
OCIother -0.19 0.90 -0.19 -0.01 0.01
Returns model variables (%)
RECLASSt/MVt-1 0.15 0.80 0.00 0.04 0.20
DNIBEXt
other/MVt-1 0.61 2.39 0.03 0.74 1.41
EXt/MVt-1 0.01 1.45 0.00 0.00 0.00
DAUGL/MVt-1 -0.12 2.77 -0.99 -0.01 0.75
OCIt
other/MVt-1 -0.24 2.69 -0.64 -0.05 0.02
Other variables
SIZE 6.95 1.49 5.84 6.71 7.70
TGL per share -0.02 0.57 -0.25 0.01 0.23
|RECLASS|/|NIBEXother| 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.05
COSTafs AUGL BVother RECLASS NIBEXother EX DAUGL OCIother
Panel B1: Correlations of market value model variables (per share) (pearson above diagonal and spearman
below diagonal)
COSTafs -0.05 -0.96*** 0.01 0.33*** 0.01 -0.09*** 0.02
AUGL 0.07** 0.08** 0.20*** 0.14*** -0.00 0.49*** -0.15***
BVother -0.94*** -0.07** -0.03 -0.12*** -0.00 0.09** -0.02
RECLASS 0.06* 0.27*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 0.01 -0.11*** -0.18**
NIBEXother 0.40*** 0.08*** -0.18*** -0.10*** 0.02 0.01 -0.05*
EX 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.14*** 0.02 -0.01
DAUGL -0.01 0.45*** 0.01 -0.07** 0.01 0.03 -0.03
OCIother -0.04 -0.18*** 0.06* -0.25*** -0.06* -0.05 -0.03
RECLASS DNIBEXother EX DAUGL OCIother
Panel B2: Correlations of returns model variables (%) (pearson above diagonal and spearman below diagonal)
RECLASSt/MVt-1 -0.05 -0.29* -0.12*** 0.12**
DNIBEXt
other/MVt-1 -0.14*** -0.10** -0.05 0.03
EXt/MVt-1 -0.02 -0.07* -0.14* 0.31*
DAUGLt/MVt-1 -0.07* -0.00 0.03 -0.05
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with NIBEXother of -0.14, again consistent with income smoothing. The Pearson
correlation is also negative but insignificant.
Table 2 reports descriptive analyses regressing RECLASS on current NIBEXother
by itself and also controlling for current AUGL in Panel A and controlling for TGL
for the current and three prior years in Panel B. The purpose of these analyses is to
provide insight into two issues: (1) whether banks use RECLASS to manage
income—income smoothing would yield a negative association of RECLASS with
NIBEXother, while big baths would yield the opposite—and (2) the strength and lag
structure of the relationship between realized and unrealized gains and losses.
The two panels of Table 2 provide consistent results. There is evidence of
income smoothing through realization of gains and losses, with a negative
coefficient of -0.01 on NIBEXother significant at the 5 % level without any control,
at the 1 % level controlling for AUGL, and the 5 % level controlling for current and
lagged TGL. While significant, this coefficient is rather small, suggesting one or
more of the following: banks’ income smoothing is limited; RECLASS is not banks’
primary income smoothing mechanism; or banks offset variation in a pre-managed
income variable other than NIBEXother. The pricing implications of RECLASS stem
primarily from the statistical reliability with which it smooths net income, however,
not from the magnitude of the smoothing.
The table also provides evidence of gradual realization of gains and losses,
implying that RECLASS is persistent. Panel A reports a positive coefficient of 0.04
on AUGL, significant at the 1 % level. Panel B reports coefficients on current and
lagged TGL that smoothly decline from 0.12 for current TGL to 0.05 for three-year-
lagged TGL, with all of the coefficients significant at the 5 % level or better.
Table 1 continued
RECLASS DNIBEXother EX DAUGL OCIother
OCIt
other/MVt-1 -0.27*** 0.03 -0.04 -0.11**
The sample includes the 200 largest (based on total assets in 1998) US commercial banks traded on NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ for the years 1998–2006. Stock return data are obtained from CRSP and most financial
data are obtained from COMPUSTAT. Accumulated unrealized gains and losses on available for sale (AFS)
securities (denoted AUGL) and reclassifications of AUGL upon realization of gains and losses (denoted RE-
CLASS) are hand collected from banks’ annual Form 10-K filings. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the
explanatory variables in the market value model [Eq. (6)] and returns model [Eq. (7)] as well as other variables.
Panel B1 (B2) reports Pearson and Spearman correlations of the explanatory variables in the market value
(returns) model. In the market value model, balance sheet variables are deflated by shares outstanding at the
fiscal year-end, and comprehensive income statement variables are deflated by the shares outstanding used to
calculate earnings per share. Returns model variables are deflated by the market value of equity at the end of the
fourth month of the fiscal year. COSTafs denotes the amortized cost of AFS securities. BVother denotes the net
book value of assets and liabilities other than AFS securities. NIBEXother denotes net income before extraor-
dinary items (denoted EX) and RECLASS. OCIother denotes other comprehensive income before the change in
AUGL. SIZE denotes the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the fourth month of the
fiscal year. TGL denotes total gains and losses on AFS securities. The full sample includes 1,033 observations
with nonmissing AUGL, RECLASS, and TGL. *, **, and *** statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels,
respectively, in two-tailed tests
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5 Pricing implications of RECLASS
Table 3 Panel A presents the results of estimating the market value model Eq. (6).
To mitigate heteroscedasticity, we deflate book value and its components by shares
outstanding at the end of the year and deflate comprehensive income and its
components by average shares outstanding during the period used in the calculation
of earnings per share. In untabulated robustness tests, we alternatively deflate by
total assets and total revenues, which yields the same inferences. To address
clustering of observations, in all equations estimated in this paper, we include year
fixed effects and report t-statistics that incorporate clustering of observations by firm
(Petersen 2009).
As benchmarks for the estimation of the full Eq. (6) reported in column V, we
first discuss the estimation of four nested versions of the equation: a pure balance
sheet model (column I), a pure comprehensive income statement model both
without and with RECLASS (columns II and III), and a combined balance sheet and
comprehensive income statement model without RECLASS (column IV). We
Table 2 Reclassifications, income smoothing, and gradual realization of total gains and losses
Dependent variable: RECLASS
Panel A: Using current level of accumulated unrealized gains and losses
Intercept 0.02 0.03*
NIBEXother -0.01** -0.01***
AUGL 0.04***
N 1,003 1,033
R2 0.04 0.07
Dependent variable: RECLASS
Panel B: Distinguishing timing of total gains and losses
Intercept 0.07**
NIBEXother -0.01**
TGL, year 0.12***
TGL, year-1 0.09***
TGL, year-2 0.07**
TGL, year-3 0.05***
N 614
R2 0.18
This table reports the results of regressing the reclassification of AUGL upon realization of gains and
losses (RECLASS) on net income before extraordinary items and RECLASS (NIBEXother), without and
with controlling for accumulated unrealized gains and losses (AUGL) for the current year (Panel A) and
on NIBEXother controlling for total gains and losses (TGL) for the current and prior three years (Panel B).
AUGL is deflated by the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end. NIBEXother and TGL are
deflated by the number of shares used in calculating earnings per share. Year dummies are included in all
regression, with t-statistics adjusted for clustering among observations for the same firm (Petersen 2009).
*, **, and *** statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests
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maintain the same decompositions of BV and CI, respectively, in the nested models
as in the full model.
The results of estimating the pure balance sheet model reported in column I
indicate that MV is significantly positively associated with AUGL at the 5 % level.
Similar to Chambers et al.’s (2007) estimated coefficient on DAUGL in their returns
model, the coefficient of 3.25 on AUGL is over twice as high as the coefficients on
COST and BVother; in fact, this coefficient is much higher than expected for
transitory gains and losses. As discussed below, this coefficient decreases to a
normal level once RECLASS and the other comprehensive income variables are
added to the model. These results are consistent with investors assigning at least
normal pricing implications to unrealized gains and losses.
The results of estimating the pure comprehensive income statement model with
RECLASS included in column III indicate that MV is significantly positively
associated with RECLASS. The total coefficient on RECLASS is b4 -
b7 = 9.88 - 0.42 = 9.46, significant at the 1 % level. The total coefficient is
closer to the coefficient of 13.34 on the relatively permanent NIBEXother than it is to
the coefficient on the relatively transitory comprehensive income components: 2.05
on EX, 0.42 on DAUGL, and 1.49 on OCIother. These results are consistent with
investors assigning considerably greater pricing implications to realized than
unrealized gains and losses. The results likely are attributable in part to RECLASS
smoothing net income and being persistent, as reported in Table 2.
Comparison of the comprehensive income statement models without and with
RECLASS reported in columns II and III indicate that the inclusion of RECLASS in
the model raises the coefficient on NIBEXother from 12.22 to 13.34, as expected if
RECLASS offsets variation in NIBEXother, with both coefficients significant at the
1 % level. However, the difference of these coefficients is insignificant.
The results of estimating the full Eq. (6) reported in column V indicate that the
pricing implications of RECLASS diminish only slightly when AUGL and the other
balance sheet variables are added to the model. Specifically, the total coefficient on
RECLASS is b4 - b7 = 7.84 - 0.56 = 7.28, significant at the 1 % level. This
total coefficient is again closer to the coefficient of 10.84 on the relatively
permanent NIBEXother than to the coefficients on the relatively transitory
comprehensive income components: 1.82 on EX, 0.56 on DAUGL, and 1.29 on
OCIother. In contrast, the coefficient on AUGL falls from 3.25 to 0.72,17 below the
expected coefficient of one for transitory gains and losses, and becomes insignificant
when RECLASS and the other comprehensive income statement variables are added
to the model.
Comparison of the full models without and with RECLASS reported in columns
IV and V indicate that the inclusion of RECLASS in the model raises the coefficient
17 Alternatively, summing the coefficients across the relevant book value and comprehensive income
terms involving AUGL in the full market value model Eq. (6) yields a total coefficient on AUGL of
b2 ? b7 = 0.72 ? 0.56 = 1.28. This coefficient remains fairly close to the expected coefficient of one
for transitory gains and losses and is insignificant. We do not use this alternative approach in the text
because, in our observation, researchers generally do not sum coefficients across overlapping book value
and comprehensive income terms in Ohlson’s market value models this fashion. See footnote 13 for
related discussion.
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Table 3 Pricing implications of reclassifications
Dependent variable: MV
I II III IV V
Panel A: Market value model
Intercept 9.09*** 4.55* 4.39* 2.71 2.35
BV
BVafs
COST 1.44*** 0.38*** 0. 40***
AUGL 3.25** 1.45 0.72
BVother 1.37*** 0.34*** 0.37***
CI
NIBEX
RECLASS 9.88*** 7.84***
NIBEXother 12.22*** 13.34*** 9.38*** 10.84***
EX 2.00 2.05 1.68 1.82
OCI
DAUGL 0.16 0.42 0.30 0.56
OCIother 1.28*** 1.49*** 1.14*** 1.29***
N 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033
R2 0.55 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.75
b4 - b7 – – 9.46*** – 7.28***
Dependent variable: market-adjusted return
I II III
Panel B: Returns model
Intercept 0.04 0.03 0.03
RECLASS 6.01**
DNIBEXother 2.70*** 2.71*** 2.86***
EX -0.11 -0.36 -0.29
DAUGL 1.59* 1.74**
OCIother -0.83 -0.68
N 884 884 884
R2 0.05 0.13 0.16
b1 - b4 4.27**
Panel A reports pooled estimations of nested and full versions of the market value model [Eq. (6)], which
regresses market value of owners’ equity (MV) on the (after-tax) components of book value of owners’ equity
(BV) and comprehensive income (CI). See Table 1 for description of these variables. The components of BV are
COST, AUGL, and BVother; they are deflated by the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end. The
components of CI are RECLASS, NIBEXother, EX, DAUGL, and OCIother; they are deflated by the number of
shares used in calculating earnings per share. Panel B reports pooled estimations of nested and full versions of
the returns model [Eq. (7)], which regresses market-adjusted return (raw return minus the value-weighted market
return) for the 12-month period ending at the end of the fourth month after a bank’s fiscal year-end on
RECLASS, DNIBEXother, EX, DAUGL, and OCIother; these variables are deflated by beginning-of-return-
interval market capitalization. The total coefficient on RECLASS, i.e., the difference of the coefficients on
RECLASS and DAUGL, is denoted b4 - b7 (b1 - b4) in the market value (returns) model. Year fixed effects
are included in all regressions, and t-statistics are adjusted for clustering of observations by firm (Petersen 2009).
*, **, and *** two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively
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on NIBEXother from 9.38 to 10.84, with both coefficients significant at the 1 %
level. However, the difference of these coefficients is again insignificant.
Table 3 Panel B presents the results of estimating the returns model Eq. (7). As
benchmarks for the estimation of the full Eq. (7) reported in column III, we briefly
discuss the estimation of two nested versions of the equation. The first nested model
includes only DNIBEXother and EX and is reported in column I. While the
coefficient on DNIBEXother is 2.70 and significant at the 1 % level, consistent with
DNIBEXother exhibiting some degree of permanence, this nested model has an R2 of
only 5 %. The second nested model includes all explanatory variables other than
RECLASS and is reported in column II. The coefficients on DNIBEXother and EX
do not change appreciably from column I. The coefficient on DAUGL is positive at
1.59 and significant at the 10 % level; while this coefficient is above one, it is not
significantly so, and it is only about half of the coefficient obtained by Chambers
et al. (2007) in their returns model. The R2 rises considerably from 5 % in column I
to 13 % in column II, indicating considerably improved goodness of fit.
The estimation of full model reported in column III yields an R2 of 16 %,
indicating further improved goodness of fit. The total coefficient on RECLASS is
b1 - b4 = 6.01 - 1.74 = 4.27, significant at the 5 % level. This total coefficient is
considerably higher than the coefficient of 2.86 on DNIBEXother, despite the fact
that the inclusion of the additional variables raises the latter coefficient slightly from
the results for the nested models reported in column I and II. As discussed in Sect. 3,
a higher coefficient on RECLASS than on NIBEXother is possible if, for example,
RECLASS perfectly offsets a fixed proportion less than 100 % of the transitory
component of NIBEXother. Opposite to the decreasing effect of the inclusion of the
RECLASS on the coefficient on AUGL in the market value model, the coefficient
on DAUGL increases slightly to 1.74 and increases in significance to the 5 % level.
Comparison of the full models without and with RECLASS reported in columns
II and III indicates that the inclusion of RECLASS in the model raises the
coefficient on DNIBEXother from 2.71 to 2.86, with both coefficients significant at
the 1 % level. However, the difference of these coefficients is insignificant.
In summary, the results of the market value and returns model analyses indicate
investors deem RECLASS to have high incremental pricing implications beyond
(D)AUGL and the other explanatory variables in those models, consistent with the
alternative hypothesis H1A.
6 Determinants of the pricing implications of RECLASS
In this section, we examine two possible explanations for the pricing implications of
RECLASS. First, we consider the possibility that the measurement of unrealized
gains and losses is unreliable, as critics of fair value accounting often allege. This
possibility is inconsistent with the findings discussed above that AUGL exhibits at
least normal pricing implications and also with the high liquidity of most AFS
securities. Second, we consider the possibility that RECLASS helps investors
predict future bank performance.
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6.1 Unreliable fair value measurement
To test whether the pricing implications of RECLASS are attributable to unreliable
fair value measurement, each year we estimate the full market value model Eq. (6)
and the full returns model Eq. (7) for two equal-sized subsamples formed based on a
proxy for the liquidity of AFS securities. Following Barth (1994), we use the
percentage of AFS securities that are US Treasuries or other US Government
securities (Treasuries) as our proxy. In untabulated robustness tests, we include
broader measures of liquid securities (Treasuries plus common stock and Treasuries
plus common stock and corporate bonds), with substantively the same results.
The results are reported in Table 4 Panel A for the market value model and Panel
B for the returns model. For the market value model, the total coefficient on
RECLASS is higher and more significant for the high liquidity subsample.
Specifically, the total coefficient on RECLASS is b4 - b7 = 11.26 - 3.83 = 7.43
in the high liquidity subsample compared to 2.93 ? 1.14 = 4.07 in the low liquidity
subsample, with the difference significant at the 5 % level. For the returns model,
the total coefficient on RECLASS also is higher and more significant for the high
liquidity subsample. Specifically, the total coefficient on RECLASS is b1 -
b4 = 8.12 - 2.63 = 5.49 in the high liquidity subsample compared to 3.95 -
1.47 = 2.48 in the low liquidity subsample, with the difference significant at the
10 % level.
Inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis H2A, the results of both the market
value and returns model analyses indicate that the pricing implications of
RECLASS do not result from the unreliability of unrealized gains and losses
recorded in AUGL.
6.2 Predicting future bank performance
As described in Sect. 3, we conduct three distinct analyses to test whether RECLASS’s
pricing implications are attributable to it enabling investors to predict future bank
performance. First, we estimate the full market value and returns models for two equal-
sized subsamples formed each year based on growth in net interest income, because the
prediction of future bank performance is more important and difficult for higher
growth banks.18 In untabulated robustness tests, we partition based on banks’ growth
in assets and total revenues, which yields the same inferences.
The results of the growth partitioning analysis are presented in Table 5. In the
market value model results reported in Panel A, the coefficient on RECLASS is
higher and more significant for the high growth subsample. Specifically, the total
coefficient on RECLASS is b4 - b7 = 11.68 - 0.25 = 11.43 and significant at the
18 Our measures of liquidity and growth are essentially uncorrelated, so that the analyses reported in
Table 4 and 5 capture different phenomena. In untabulated analyses, we estimated Eqs. (6) and (7) for the
four subsamples formed by the intersections of the two liquidity and two growth subsamples. We find that
the coefficients on RECLASS are highest and significant in the high liquidity and high growth subsample,
about half the size but still significant at the 10 % level or better for both the high liquidity and low
growth subsample and the low liquidity and high growth subsample, and approximately zero and
insignificant in the low liquidity and low growth subsamples.
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1 % level in the high growth subsample and only 2.65 ? 0.54 = 3.19 and
insignificant in the low growth subsample, with the difference of 8.24 significant at
the 1 % level. In the returns model analysis reported in Panel B, the total coefficient
on RECLASS is b1 - b4 = 9.07 - 1.83 = 7.24 and significant at the 5 % level in
the high growth subsample and only 3.65 - 1.59 = 2.06 and insignificant in the
low growth subsample, with the difference of 5.18 significant at the 10 % level.
Consistent with the alternative hypothesis H3A, the results of both the market value
and returns models analyses indicate that the pricing implications of RECLASS are
stronger for higher growth banks.
Surprisingly, however, the coefficients on NIBEXother in both the market value
and returns models do not vary much or significantly across the growth subsamples.
This appears to result in part from our predetermined choice to partition based on
Table 4 Effect of AFS security
liquidity (reliability of fair
values) on the pricing
implications of reclassifications
Panel A reports pooled
estimations of the market value
model [Eq. (6)], and Panel B
reports pooled estimations of the
returns model [Eq. (7)] for banks
with above and below median
liquidity AFS securities (more
and less reliable fair values,
respectively). See Tables 1 and
3 for description of the models
and variables. Liquidity is
measured as the percentage of
available-for-sale securities
invested in US Treasuries and
other US government securities.
The total coefficient on
RECLASS, i.e., the difference of
the coefficients on RECLASS
and DAUGL, is denoted b4 -
b7 (b1 - b4) in the market value
(returns) model. Year fixed
effects are included in all
regressions, and t-statistics are
adjusted for clustering of
observations by firm (Petersen
2009). *, **, and *** two-tailed
statistical significance at 10, 5,
and 1 % levels
High liquidity Low liquidity
Panel A: Market value model
Intercept 3.66*** 4.09*
BV
BVafs
COST 0.61*** 0.69***
AUGL 1.66 2.20*
BVother 0.59*** 0.67***
CI
NIBEX
RECLASS 11.26*** 2.93*
NIBEXother 8.11*** 7.84***
EX -3.64 3.40
OCI
DAUGL 3.83** -1.14
OCIother 0.83 1.73**
N 489 482
R2 0.83 0.75
b4 - b7 7.43*** 4.07
(b4 - b7)
High - (b4 - b7)
Low 3.36**
Panel B: Returns model
Intercept 0.04 0.04
RECLASS 8.12** 3.95*
DNIBEXother 2.58*** 2.50***
EX -2.01 -2.17
DAUGL 2.63** 1.47*
OCIother -0.63 -0.84
N 419 416
R2 0.18 0.15
b1 - b4 5.49** 2.48
(b1 - b4)
High - (b1 - b4)
Low 3.01*
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growth in net interest income, a component of NIBEXother. For example, if we
partition on growth in total assets, the coefficients on NIBEXother increase
significantly from the low to high growth subsamples.
Second, we estimate the association of RECLASS with year-ahead CI using
Eq. (8).19 We also conduct similar analyses replacing year-ahead CI as the dependent
variable with two of its components: year-ahead NIBEXother and RECLASS. We
Table 5 Effect of bank growth
on the pricing implications of
reclassifications
Panel A reports pooled
estimations of the market value
model [Eq. (6)], and Panel B
reports pooled estimations of the
returns model [Eq. (7)] for banks
with above and below median
growth in net interest income.
See Tables 1 and 3 for
description of the model and
variables. The total coefficient
on RECLASS, i.e., the
difference of the coefficients on
RECLASS and DAUGL, is
denoted b4 - b7 (b1 - b4) in
the market value (returns)
model. Year fixed effects are
included in all regressions, and
t-statistics are adjusted for
clustering of observations by
firm (Petersen 2009). *, **, and
*** two-tailed statistical
significance at 10, 5, and 1 %
levels
High net int. inc.
growth
Low net int. inc.
growth
Panel A: Market value model
Intercept 3.99 1.35
BV
BVafs
COST 0.35*** 0.40***
AUGL 1.11 0.64
BVother 0.28* 0.40***
CI
NIBEX
RECLASS 11.68*** 2.65*
NIBEXother 11.42*** 10.37***
EX -4.11 8.17*
OCI
DAUGL 0.25 -0.54
OCIother 1.62** 0.47
N 519 513
R2 0.71 0.80
b4 - b7 11.43*** 3.19
(b4 - b7)
High -
(b4 - b7)
Low
8.24***
Panel B: Returns model
Intercept 0.05 0.02
RECLASS 9.07** 3.65*
DNIBEXother 3.13*** 3.31***
EX -2.92** 2.55*
DAUGL 1.83 1.59
OCIother -0.53 -1.12
N 447 437
R2 0.16 0.20
b1 - b4 7.24** 2.06
(b1 - b4)
High -
(b1 - b4)
Low
5.18*
19 Because RECLASS may be associated with many future years’ CI, to maximize the power of the test,
the dependent variable ideally would be future CI summed over more than one year in these analyses. We
do not do this to avoid losing observations due to the limited number of years of data available.
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Table 6 Association between year-ahead comprehensive income and reclassifications
Dependent variable
CIt?1 NIBEXt?1 RECLASSt?1
Panel A: Overall sample
Intercept -0.15 -0.35* 0.00
BV
BVafs
COST 0.01 0.03*** -0.00
AUGL -0.23* 0.03 0.06***
BVother 0.01 0.03*** -0.00
CI
NIBEX
RECLASS 0.61* 0.29* 0.39***
NIBEXother 0.90*** 0.78*** 0.01
EX -0.08 -0.35 0.11**
OCI
DAUGL -0.23 -0.12 0.05**
OCIother 0.24** 0.03 -0.01*
N 973 973 959
R2 0.54 0.69 0.19
c4 - c7 0.84** 0.41* 0.34***
Panel B: High net interest income growth sub-sample
Intercept -0.25 -0.18 0.04
BV
BVafs
COST 0.01 0.02** -0.00
AUGL -0.39* 0.00 0.06**
BVother 0.01 0.02** -0.01*
CI
NIBEX
RECLASS 1.20* 0.75** 0.58***
NIBEXother 1.02*** 0.84*** 0.01
EX -0.65 -1.03* 0.05*
OCI
DAUGL 0.15 -0.16 0.07**
OCIother 0.31** 0.10** -0.01
N 490 490 485
R2 0.58 0.69 0.27
c4 - c7 1.05* 0.91*** 0.51***
Panel C: Low net interest income growth sub-sample
Intercept -0.03 -0.39*** -0.01
BV
BVafs
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examine these components of CI because the descriptive analyses reported in Table 2
suggest that banks smooth net income using RECLASS, and so it should predict year-
ahead NIBEXother, and that RECLASS reflects gradual realization of gains and losses,
and so current RECLASS should predict year-ahead RECLASS. We conduct these
analyses for the overall sample as well as for the growth subsamples examined in
Table 5. We do not tabulate the results for the liquidity subsamples because we neither
expect nor find that these subsamples have distinct implications for predicting future
bank performance. Parallel to the analyses of market value pricing implications
discussed in Sect. 5, we examine the total coefficient c4 - c7 on RECLASS in Eq. (8).
Because RECLASS has higher pricing implications for the high growth subsample, it
should also have higher total coefficients c4 - c7 in Eq. (8) for that subsample.
We report the results of these analyses in Table 6. Panels A, B, and C report the
results for the overall sample and the high and low growth subsamples, respectively.
In the overall sample analysis reported in Panel A, the total coefficient on
RECLASS is significantly positive at the 5 % level in the CI regression, the 10 %
level in the NIBEX regression, and at the 1 % level in the RECLASS regression.
Hence RECLASS helps investors predict future bank performance, consistent with
the alternative hypothesis H4A.
Table 6 continued
Dependent variable
CIt?1 NIBEXt?1 RECLASSt?1
COST 0.02 0.03*** -0.00
AUGL -0.17 0.04 0.05**
BVother 0.02 0.03*** 0.00
CI
NIBEX
RECLASS -0.09 -0.09 0.24***
NIBEXother 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.01
EX 0.41 0.38 0.26*
OCI
DAUGL -0.67* -0.15 0.02
OCIother 0.12 -0.08** -0.01
N 482 482 473
R2 0.55 0.71 0.16
c4 - c7 0.58 0.06 0.22***
This table reports pooled estimations of regressions of year-ahead comprehensive income (CI) and two its
components—year-ahead net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (NIBEX) and
reclassification of gains and losses on AFS securities upon realization (RECLASS)—on the same explan-
atory variables as the market value model [Eq. (6)]. See Tables 1 and 3 for description of that model and the
explanatory variables. The total coefficient on RECLASS, i.e., the difference of the coefficients on RE-
CLASS and DAUGL, is denoted c4 - c7. Panel A reports results for the overall sample, and Panel
B(C) reports results for the high (low) growth in net interest income subsamples. Year fixed effects are
included in all regressions, and t-statistics are adjusted for clustering of observations for the same firm
(Petersen 2009). *, **, and *** two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively
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Table 7 Year-ahead comprehensive income and pricing implications of reclassifications
High net int. inc. growth
Without CIt?1 With CIt?1
Panel A: Market value model
Intercept 3.14 4.51
BVt
BVt
afs
COSTt 0.32*** 0.20*
AUGLt 0.52 1.38
BVt
other 0.25* 0.13
CIt
NIBEXt
RECLASSt 12.89*** 9.77*
NIBEXt
other 11.70*** 5.89***
EXt -3.85 2.34
OCIt
DAUGLt 0.43 1.50
OCIt
other 1.86** 0.94**
CIt?1
NIBEXt?1
RECLASSt?1 4.73*
NIBEXt?1
other 6.98***
EXt?1 0.19
OCIt?1
DAUGLt?1 1.50
OCIt?1
other 0.78
N 485 485
R2 0.71 0.77
b4 - b7 12.46*** 8.27**
(b4 - b7)
Without - (b4 - b7)
With 4.19**
Panel B: Returns model
Intercept 0.05 -0.00
RECLASSt 10.12*** 6.79**
DNIBEXt
other 2.41** 3.31***
EXt -2.95 -2.89
DAUGLt 1.75** 1.08
OCIt
other -0.40 -0.57
RECLASSt?1 6.22***
DNIBEXt?1
other 3.43***
EXt?1 2.22
DAUGLt?1 1.07
OCIt?1
other -0.76
N 414 414
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In the growth subsample results reported in Panels B and C, the total coefficient
on RECLASS is consistently higher and more significant for the high growth
subsample. In the CIt?1 regression, the total coefficient is about three times more
positive and significant at the 10 % level in the high growth subsample and
insignificant in the low growth subsample. In the NIBEXt?1 regression, the total
coefficient is about thirty times more positive and significant at the 1 % level in the
high growth subsample and insignificant in the low growth subsample. In the
RECLASSt?1 regression, the total coefficient is about three times more positive in
the high growth subsample but significant at the same 1 % level in the two
subsamples. These results are all consistent with the alternative hypothesis H4A.
Third, we control for the components of CIt?1 in the market value and returns
models. We tabulate results for the high growth subsample only, because the total
coefficients on RECLASS are insignificant in the low growth subsample whether or
not we control for the components of CIt?1. The results are reported in Table 7 Panel A
for the market value model and Panel B for the returns model. The total coefficient on
RECLASS declines by about a third and significantly at the 5 % level in both the
market value and returns models consistent with RECLASS’s high pricing implica-
tions being attributable in significant part to it helping investors predict future bank
performance. These results are consistent with the alternative hypothesis H5A.
In summary, RECLASS predicts banks’ year-ahead CI, more so for banks with
more liquid AFS securities and higher growth. This predictive power explains a
significant part of the pricing implications of RECLASS reported in Tables 3 and 5.
6.3 Other determinants considered
In untabulated analyses, we considered four other possible determinants of the
implications of RECLASS for pricing or future bank performance. First, as
discussed above, in our sample RECLASS almost always reflects economic
realization of gains and losses. Such realization may occur because the bank needs
cash. Second, banks’ Tier 1 regulatory capital is increased by their realization of
gains (Moyer 1990). During our sample period, however, almost all US banks had
Table 7 continued
High net int. inc. growth
Without CIt?1 With CIt?1
R2 0.16 0.40
b1 - b4 8.37** 5.71*
(b1 - b4)
Without - (b1 - b4)
With 2.66**
This table reports pooled estimations of the market value model [Eqs. (6)] and the returns model [Eq. (7)] for
banks with above and below median growth in net interest income, both with and without the components of
year-ahead comprehensive income included. See Tables 1 and 3 for description of the market value and
returns models and variables. b4 - b7 (b1 - b4) denotes the total coefficient on RECLASS, i.e., the dif-
ference of the coefficients on RECLASS and DAUGL, in the market value (returns) model. Year fixed effects
are included in all regressions, and t-statistics are adjusted for clustering of observations by firm (Petersen
2009). *, **, and *** two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 % levels
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ample access to liquidity and were well capitalized, and so these possible
determinants are a priori unlikely to explain the pricing implications of RECLASS.
Consistent with this, we found no evidence that RECLASS is associated with cash
on hand (defined as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets) or regulatory
capital (defined as Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio), or that partitioning Eqs. (6)–(8)
on above versus below median values of these variables affects the implications of
RECLASS for pricing or future bank performance.
Third, banks may realize gains and losses for tax purposes. We found no
evidence that RECLASS is associated with tax status (defined as amount of tax-
exempt interest income as a percentage of total interest income to proxy for
marginal tax rate, as in Collins et al. 1995), or that partitioning Eqs. (6)–(8) on
above versus below median values of this variable affects the implications of
RECLASS for pricing or future bank performance.
Fourth, given uncertainty about the reliability of banks’ reported unrealized gains
and losses, we consider the possibility that investors react more to banks’ realized
gains and losses when they have the opposite sign of (i.e., contradict rather than
conform to) unrealized gains and losses. We partition the observations into four
groups based on RECLASS above versus below zero and beginning AUGL20 above
versus below the mean for the sample that year. We pool the two groups where
RECLASS and AUGL conflict (i.e., RECLASS \ 0 and AUGL above median and
RECLASS [ 0 and AUGL below median) and the two groups where the variables
conform. We find no evidence that the coefficient on RECLASS is higher when
RECLASS and AUGL contradict rather than conform.
7 Conclusion
In this study, we find that realized gains and losses for a sample of large commercial
banks’ AFS securities have pricing implications incremental to accumulated
unrealized gains and losses and extensive decompositions of book value and
comprehensive income. Moreover, we find that the coefficient on realized gains and
losses is closer to the coefficient on the relatively permanent net income before
extraordinary items than to the coefficients on the relatively transitory accumulated
unrealized gains and losses and other components of comprehensive income. We
also provide evidence that the pricing implications of realized gains and losses are
attributable to realized gains and losses helping investors predict future bank
performance, more so for higher growth banks, rather than to realized gains and
losses remedying the unreliability of fair value accounting for AFS securities. The
lack of evidence that the reliability of fair values affects the pricing implications of
realized gains and losses may reflect our largely favorable 1998–2006 sample
period.
Importantly, our sample period is after the effective date of SFAS No. 130. This
standard required firms to prominently present realized gains and losses and other
20 We partition by beginning, not ending, AUGL so that the partitioning variables are not tautologically
related.
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components of comprehensive income in their financial statements. Our results
regarding the pricing implications of realized gains and losses are much stronger
than the corresponding prior results in Barth (1994) and, to a lesser extent, Ahmed
and Takeda (1995). Both of these studies examine sample periods ending prior to
the effective date of SFAS No. 130 in 1998 or any other fair value accounting or
disclosure standard issued by the FASB.
The difference between our findings and those of Barth (1994) and Ahmed and
Takeda (1995) mirror the difference between the findings of studies examining the
pricing implications of other comprehensive pre-SFAS No. 130 (Dhaliwal et al.
1999; O’Hanlon and Pope 1999) versus post-SFAS No. 130 (Biddle and Choi 2006;
Chambers et al. 2007). Collectively, these studies strongly suggest that prominent
presentation in financial statements increases the pricing implications of the
components of comprehensive income. Our results may also reflect investors’
increasing familiarity with fair value accounting numbers over time.
Subject to caveats detailed in the introduction about the conclusions that can be
drawn from our market association study and the magnitude and pricing
implications of income smoothing using realization of gains and losses, our
findings suggest that the FASB should continue to require information about
realized gains and losses, an amortized cost accounting construct, to be prominently
presented in financial statements within the fair-value-accounting framework for
AFS securities. The FASB currently intends to require parenthetical presentation on
the balance sheet of the amortized costs for many financial instruments recognized
at fair value. While this proposal likely has political motivations, we find it a
sensible way to preserve amortized cost accounting while still broadening fair value
accounting for financial instruments.
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Appendix
SFAS 130 requires US firms to disclose comprehensive income and its components,
including the reclassification of accumulated other comprehensive income associ-
ated with realization of gains and losses for AFS securities, in their financial reports.
This appendix provides representative examples of banks’ disclosures.
Other comprehensive income disclosures
Banks typically disclose the components of comprehensive income either in the
statement of owners’ equity or in a separate table. We provide an example of each
of these formats below, enclosing the reclassifications in boxes for easy
identification.
Statement of Owners’ Equity Example:
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Separate Table Example:
For the years ended December 31 (in thousands) 2003 2002 2001
North Fork Bancorporation consolidated statements
of comprehensive income
Net income $396,365 $416,893 $331,484
Other comprehensive income
Unrealized (losses)/gains on securities
Changes in unrealized gains arising during the year (44,434) 32,166 34,197
Less: reclassification adjustment for gains included in net income (15,762) (4,517) (8,729)
Changes in unrealized gains arising during the year (60,196) 27,649 25,468
Related tax effect on unrealized gains arising during the year 25,884 (11,889) (10,951)
Net change in unrealized gains arising during the year (34,312) 15,760 14,517
Unrealized gains/(losses) on derivative instruments
Changes in unrealized (losses)/gains arising during the year (5,465) (46,992) (33,833)
Add: reclassification adjustment for expenses/losses included
in net income
30,512 32,763 9,500
Changes in unrealized (losses)/gains arising during the year 25,047
Related tax effect on changes in unrealized gains arising
during the year
(10,770) 6,119 10,463
Net change in unrealized gains arising during the year 14,277 (8,110) (13,870)
Net other comprehensive (loss)/income $(20,035) $7,650 $647
Comprehensive income $376,330 $424,543 $332,131
Reclassification disclosures
In addition to the disclosures above, banks typically disclose reclassifications in a
separate table, as shown in the following example.
The following table presents the after-tax changes in net unrealized holdings
gains (losses), reclassification adjustments for realized gains and losses on AFS
securities and cash flow hedges, changes resulting from foreign currency
translation adjustments (including the impact of related derivatives), net gains
and losses and prior service costs from pension and OPEB plans, and
amortization of pension an OPEB amounts into Net Income. The tale also
reflects the adjustment to Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)
resulting from initial application of SFAS 158 to the Firm’s defined benefit
pension and OPEB plans. Reclassification adjustments include amounts recog-
nized in Net income that had been recorded previously in Other comprehensive
income (loss).
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Year ended
December 31,
(in millions)
2007 2008 2009
Before
tax
Tax
effect
After
tax
Before
tax
Tax
effect
After
tax
Before
tax
Tax
effect
After
tax
Unrealized gains (losses) on AFS securities
Net unrealized
holdings gains
(losses) arising
during the
period
$431 $(176) $255 $(403) $144 $(259) $(1,706) $648 $(1,058)
Reclassification
adjustment for
realized
(gains) losses
included in
Net Income
164 (67) 97 797 (285) 512 1,443 (548) 895
Net change 595 (243) 352 394 (141) 253 (263) 100 (163)
Source: JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2007 Annual Report, p. 163
Some banks also provide this reclassification information along with a roll
forward of the balances of accumulated other comprehensive income in a table.
Note 17. Accumulated other comprehensive income
The Bancorp has elected to present the disclosures required by SFAS No. 130,
‘‘Reporting of Comprehensive Income,’’ in the Consolidated Statements of changes
in Shareholders’ Equity and in the following table. Disclosure of the reclassification
adjustments, related tax effects allocated to other comprehensive income and
accumulated other comprehensive income as of and for the years ended December
31 were as follows:
($ in millions) Total other
comprehensive income
Total accumulated other
comprehensive income
Pretax
activity
Tax
effect
Net
activity
Beginning
balance
Net
activity
Ending
balance
2007
Gains on available-for-sale securities $ 60 (23) 37
Reclassification adjustment for net gains
recognized in net income
(21) 9 (12)
Unrecognized gains (losses) on available-
for-sale securities
39 (14) 25 (119) 25 (94)
Gains on cash flow hedge derivatives 42 (15) 27
Reclassification adjustment for net gains
on cash flow hedge derivatives
recognized in net income
(1) – (1)
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($ in millions) Total other comprehensive
income
Total accumulated other
comprehensive income
Pretax
activity
Tax
effect
Net
activity
Beginning
balance
Net
activity
Ending
balance
Unrecognized gains (losses) on cash
flow hedge derivatives
41 (15) 26 (1) 26 25
Defined benefit plans
Net prior service cost – – –
Net actuarial loss 3 (1) 2
Total pension and other
postretirement obligations
3 (1) 2 (59) 2 (57)
Total $ 83 (30) 53 (179) 53 (126)
Source: Fifth Third Bancorp, 2007 Annual Report, p. 75
As evidenced in both of these sample disclosures, most banks report both the pre-
tax and after-tax reclassifications. For those that report only the pre-tax reclassi-
fications, we use the standard federal tax rate of 35 % to calculate the after-tax
reclassifications.
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